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[L. A. No. 20585. In Bank. Oct. 1, 194ft]

REVEREND A. L. BREWER et a1., Respondcnt.q, v. SECOND BAPTIST CHURCH OF LOS ANGELES (a
Religious Corporation) et aI., Defendants; REVEREND
J. RAYMOND HENDERSON et aI., Appellants.

)

[1] Libel-Privileged Oommunications-Qua.li1ied Privilege.-Ordinarily. the common interest of the members of a church in
church matters is sufiicient to give rise to a qualified privilege
to communications between members on subjects relating to
the church's interest.
[2] Id. - Privileged Communications - QuaWied Privilege. - The
qualliled privilege applicab,e to communications by persons
interested is lost if the publication is motivated by hatred or
ill will, or by any cause other than the desire to protect the
intrrest for the protection of which the privilege is given.
[8] Id.-Privileged Oommunications-QuaWied Privilege. - Ordinarily the quali1l.ed privilege applicable to communications by
. persons interested is lost if the publisher has no reasonable
grounds for bt'lieving his statements to be true.
(4] Id.-Evidence-lI/[alice.-In an action aA'aillst the p:.stor and
. other officers of a church for libpl, th.! cvidl'nce supported an
implied finding of thr jury that tht' pastor was motivated by
a malil!ious or improprr motive in making t.he charbes against
plllintiffs, whert' a rift dcvl'loped betw!'en the pastor and one
plnintiff bc,':msr of his failure to accept the ,astor's suggestion as t.o the plnee for purchasing furnishings fo1' the new

[1] Privill'~c as to communi"ll.tions rt:spccting church matters,
note, 63 A.L.R. 649. SI'e, Il.lso, 16 Cal.Jur. 67; 33 Am.Jur. 123.
lIrIcK. Dig. References: [1, 3] Lib!'l, § 30; [2] Libel, § 30(1);
[4, 5] Libul, § 79; [6] Libel, § 77; [I] Damages, § 211; [R] Lihel,
§ 3U; [9, 11] ApPl'Il.1 :wd Error, § 1428; [10] Damages, § 13(,.
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rectory, where the pastor refused Lu allow the other plaintiff
to speak in defense of a membp.r who had been expelled for
criticizing the pastor's administration, and where, at the meeting at which such plaintiff was expelled, the pastor refused
to allow plaintiff's son to speak in his father's defense.
[6] Id.-Evidence-Malice.-Although malice may not bi! inferred
from thl' fact alone of the communication of a defamatory
statement (Civ. Code, § 48), the tenor of the statement may be
evidence of malice.
[6] Id.-Evidence.-In an action against the pastor and other officers of a church for libel, it could not be said that the evidence
was insufficient to support a verdict against defendants other
than the pastor, where the jury could have in~erred therefrom
that, in stating that one plaintiff was remov~d from the board
of trustees because of his vile spirit and disrespect for leadership, defendants exaggerated the cause of his dismissal, that
defendants lacked reasonable grounds for believing the charges,
and that in drafting the charges they were carelessly repeating statements previously made to the congregation by the
pastor.
[7] Damages-lnstructions.-In an act:on against the pastor and
other officers of a church for libel, it was error to instruct
the jury that plaintiffs were entitled to recover exemplary
as well as compensatory damages if the jury found that
the article in question was published wantonly, recklessly
and with an utter disregar:i as to whether it was true or false,
sinC9" a plaintiff is never entitled as a matter of right to
exemplary damages.
[8] Libel-Damages.-In an action against the pastor and other
officers of a church for libel, an award of $2,000 general damages, approved by the trial court on motion for new trial, was
not excessive in the absence of a showing that the jury was
influenced by passion or prejudice.
[9] Appeal-Reversal-New Trial as to Certain Issues.-The appellate courts have power to order a retrial on a limited issue,
if that issU(.' can be scparatdy tried without such confusion
or uncertainty as would amount to a denial of a fair trial.
[10] Damages-Exemplary Damages.-Thc rule that exemplary
d:lma~lS cannot be imposed unless plaintiff has suffered' actual
damu!;cs is bused on tht principle that defendant must have
committed a tortious act before exemplary damages can be
ass('ssl'd.
[11] Appeal-Reversal-New Trial as to Certain Issues.-In an
action for libel, a retrial on the issue of exemplary damll:;es
against one defendant was ordpred on nppcal wherp th'lt
issue was separate and distinct from tlwt of actu!)1 dllmnges,
and where there could be 110 retrial on the issu(' of gcueraldam-
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ages as to IUch defcndant alon~ bco:mso nIl defclldl\llts wtlre
jointly and leverally liable on the judgment for gcner!ll daJoagel.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. .Alfred L. Bartlett, Judge. Affirmed in pnrt
and reversed in part.
Action for damages for libel. Judgment for plaintiff!!
reversed 88 to one defendant with directions to retry issue
of exemplary damages; affirmed in other respects.
, Jerry Giesler, Meyer M. Willner and Thomaa L. Griffith,
Jr., for Appellants.
A. Brigham Rose for Respondents.
TRAYNOR, J.-In an action for libel, judgment was entered in favor of plaintiffs for a total of $14,000. Both plainti1,Is were members of the Second Baptist Church of Los
Angeles. Defendant Henderson W88 the pastor of the church i
defendants Hilton and Hudson were chairman and secretary,
respectively, of the board of deacons. Exemplary damages
were sought against defendant Henderson only. The jury
. returned verdicts in favor of each plaintiff for $2,000 general damages against the three defendants and $5,000 exemplary damages against defendant Henderson.
The publication of the defamatory statements followed a
oontroversy in the church over the validity of certain elections to the board of trustees and the board of deacons.
Reverend Venerable, a member of the church who had been
recently expelled, brought an action to have these elections
declared void. His complaint alleged that the chUrch officials were taking steps to withdraw funds of the church Ilnd
use them against the will of the members who had been
wrongfully excluded from the management of the affairs of
the church. His attorney joined plaintiffs Brewer and Fisher
as coplaintiffs in that action. A demurrer was sustaint:d to
Reverend Vcn"rable's amendod complaint, and hif: suit was
di::mli;sed. 'l'hcrenfter, the board of deacons held 1\ meeting,
which Reverend Henderson attended. 'l'hey d(.'cided to recommend to the church membership that plaintiffs Brewer
and Fisher be expelled from the church becam:c of their
MtiOll ill juiniug with ReVt:!rl'ud V cllernblc in his suit. DofendllllUi Hilton and Hudsun were delegawd by the board
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to Jraw up charges for prescutation t.o thc church. 'fhe text
of thc chargcs was left to their discretion. Lctters wcre then
sent to plaintiffs informing them that ehar1!l'S would be filed
against them at the next meeting of the church, and requesting them to be present. A copy of the charges was enclosed
with each letter. Defendant Hendcrson testified that he read
and approved the charges and their transmission to plaintiffs.
Neither plaintiff appeared at the next meeting of the
church, when the charges were read to the membership,
which then voted to withdraw "the hand of fellowship"
from plaintiffs and expel them from the church.
These charges read as follows:
I I October
12, 1945. To the membership of the Second
Baptist Church, Los Angeles, California, we, the Deacon
Board of the above church, at our regular monthly meeting
took under ~erious consideration the recent attempt on the
part of two members of our church, aided by a third, recently
dismissed from the church, to bring our church into court.
On~ of these men was the fu!v. W. A. Venerable, who, because ofa recent vile attack upon the deacons and minister,
was dismissed from our fellowship. The other was Rev. A. L.
Brewer, a non-contributing member, and the other Mr.
Eu!!,cne Fisher, former trustee, who was put out of office Lecause of his vile spirit and utter disrespect for leadership.
We cnn bring no action against the fu!v. Venerable, who
undcr the role of a minister of Jesus, is one of Satan's
choicest tools, because he is not a member of our church.
If the case had gone to trial this fact would have been brought
to light. We do hold the other two, Brewer and Fisher
responsible, and do charge them before the church as follows:
"We charge that they both complained to the civil authorities that our elections of 1942 of both deacons and trustees
when we enlarged our board were illegal. The judge ruled
their complaint false and would not permit trial.
"We charge that they complained that the officers of
the church were planning to withdraw church funds from
the Liberty Savings Loan Company and the Security-First
National Bank and misuse them, and that the judge ruled
their complaint false.
"Wc chargl~ that they amended their complaint to the
effect that in our business meetings we failed to send written
notice to each and every member. 1'he judge ruled that they
were again in error, due to the fact that the church has a
constitution, which provides, not for a written notice, but
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for the notice of said meeting's 'Twice on Sunday, morning
and evening prior to said meeting,' Article 13 section C.
"We charge that they both in reality admitted their own
error by reason of the fact that they could not find another
ground on which to amend their complaint. On the other
hand, through their lawyer, they offered not to even try to
umtlnd t;heir complaint, if we, the Second Baptist Church
would allow them to drop the matter, and we the church
pny $175 court cost which they would have to pay if they
lost. We refused to let them drop the case.
.
. "We charge that on September 20th, when they had their
final opportunity to attempt to amend their complaint and
try to get us into court trial, not one of the complainants
appeared in court. This was an open acknowledgement of
failuro and a clear vindication of the correctness with which
the business affairs of Second Baptist Church are conducted.
In consequence of their failure, the attempted effort to embarrass the officers, minister, and church was automatically
dropped, and the judge signed the order compelling them to
pay to the court the $175 which had already been paid by our
church. This money will be refunded to Second Baptist
Church by the complaining parties.
"We further charge that the action of both of these lUen in
attempting to bring us before civil authority on grounds of
proven falsity has hurt the prestige and good name of the
church, its officers, and minister, because of the widespread
newspaper publicity given to it.
"We charge that this attempt to bring the church into
court has caused us to spend considerable and unnecessary
funds of the church for attorneys fees which we might have
used for our church work.
"We finally charge that both of these men have by their
unwarranted actions and downright falsehood revealed themselves as totally unworthy of the continned confidence, respect, and fellowship of a great church which they have 80
grievously wronged.
"We do therefore unanimously recommend that the hand
of fellowship be withdrawn from them and they both be
excluded from the church.
"The Deacon Board of Second Baptist Church, John H.
Hilton, Chairman, R. A. Hudson, Secretary. "
A press release reporting the actiun of the church was
given to the local press, and an article that substantially
followed the local release apprared in the newspaper, the
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Natiollal Baptist Voice, a paper of nationwide circulation
devoted to the affairs of the Baptist Church. This article reported the ouster of plaintiffs Brewer and Fisher and stated
that their charges against the church had been found false by
the judge.
Section 45 of the Civil Code defines libel as "a false and
unprivileged publication by writing, . . . which exposes any
person to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or which
causes him to be shunned or avoided, or which has a tendency to injure him in his occupation." The charges in this
case, if false and unprivileged, were libelous. Because of
their alleged falsehoods plaintiffs were charged with having
"revealed themselves as totally unworthy of the continued
confidence, respect, and fellowship of a great church." They.
were described as persons willing to lie in order to injure
their church. Plaintiff Fisher was charged with a vile spirit,
and both plaintiffs were associated with one who "under the
role of a minister of Jesus, is one of Satan's choicest tools."
The charges were designed to injure plaintiffs' reputations
in the church and to cause them to be shunned and avoided.
The language was aptly chosen for this purpose.
The evidence was sufficient to warrant the jury's concluding that the ·charges were false. There was a conflict in the
evidence as to whether Reverend Venerable's allegations were
in fact false, and the judge in the Venerable action never
ruled that they were. The jury could find that neither plaintiff authorized his joinder or understood the significance of
the appearance of his name on the complaint and that neither
was deliberately bringing false charges against his church.
Defendants contend, however, that the publication of the
charges was privileged within the meaning of section 47(3)
of the Civil Code. Section 47 provides: "A privileged publication or broadcast is one made . . . 3. In a communica·
tion, without malice, to a person interested therein, (1) by
one who is also interested, or (2) by one who stands in such
relation to the person interested as to afford a reasonable
ground for supposing the motive for the communication
innocent, or (3) who is requested by the person interested
to give the information." [1] Ordinarily, the common
interest of the members of a church in church matters is
sufficient to give rise to a qualified privilege to communications between members on subjects relating to the church'8
interest. (Slocinski v. Radwan, 83 N.H. 501 [144 A. 787,
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63 A.L.R. 643] ; Prosser, Torts, 838; and see cases collected
in note, 63 A.L.R. 649.) A privilege would exist in this
case if the publication had been made without malice and the
occasion had not been abused. Recently in Emde v. Sa-ta
Joaquin Oounty etc. Council, 23 Cal.2d 146, 154 {143 P.~
20, 150 A.L.R. 916], this court had occasion to consider tl.t·
scope of the privilege granted by section 47 (3) of the Civit
Code. It was there said: "Even greater protection is accorded one who makes a statement, in a reasonable manner
and for a proper purpose, to persons having a common inter··
est with him in the subject matter of the communication.
when the publication is of a kind reasonably calculated to
protect or further it. (Civ. Code, § 47, subd. 3; 3 Rest., Torts,
§ 596; Prosser on Torts, § 94, p. 837; see also 3 Rest., Torts,
§§ 594, 595.) For this conditional privilege extends to false
statements of fact, although the occasion may be a~used and
the protection of the privilege lost. by the publisher's lack of
belief, or of reasonable grounds for belief, in the truth of
the defamatory matter, by excessive publication, by a publication of defamatory matter for an improper purpose, or if
the defamation goes beyond the group interest." [2] Thus
the privilege is lost if the publication is motivated by hatred
or ill will toward plaintiff (Davis v. Hearst, 160 Cal. 143,
164 fIl6 P. 530]: Snively v. Record Publishing Co., 185
Cal. 565, 577 [198 P. 1]; Siemon v. Finkle, 190 Cal. 611,
618 [213 P. 9541), or by any cause other than the desire to
protect the interest for the protection of which the privilege
is given. (See Davis v. Hearst, supra, 164; Prosser, Torts,
850; Restatement, Torts, § 603.) [3] Although there are
situations where the protection of the interest involved may
make it reasonable to report rumors or statements that the
publisher may even know are false (see Prosser, Torts, 851;
Restatement, Torts, § 602), ordinarily the privilege is lost
if defendant has no reasonable grounds for believing bis
statements to be true. (M~1es v. Rosenthal, 90 Cal.App. 390,
407 [266 P. 320]; see Emde v. San Joaquin etc. Council,
supra; Prosser, Torts, 851; Restatement, Torts. § 601.) The
wisdom of limitations on qualified privileges is well df'monstrated by the facts here involved. As a result of the publication of the charges both plaintiffs were expelled from thf'ir
church. Plaintiff Fisher had been a member of the board
of trustees for 25 years. Plaintiff Brewer was an ordained
minister of, the Baptist Church. His expUlsion resulted' 'in

\
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the loss of his membership in the Baptist Ministers Union,
and the jury could have concluded that he also lost opportunities to preach in other churches.
[4] The question then is whether the evidence is sufficient
to support the implied finding of the jury that dt·fendants
werl' motivated ,by a malicious or other improper motive or
pUblished their charges without reasonable grounds for belh'ving them. There is ample evidence in the record to support thf' inference that Reverend Henderson was motivated
eithl'r by ill will toward plaintiffs or by a desire to oust any
mcmbf'rs from the church who would dare to question his
administration. While plaintiff Fisher was still a trustee, he
served on a committee to select furnishings for the new rectory. Instead of accepting Reverend Henderson's suggestion
as to where the furniture should be purchased, he insisted
that the conu;nittee make an investigation of the furniture
market. This led defendant Henderson to remark: "I see
I have got to get rid of you, I can't work with you." By
the time of the annual meeting of the church in January
1945, the rift between Reverend Henderson and plaintiff
Fisher had widened. At that meeting Reverend Henderson
addressed the church as follows: "Now, E. W. Fisher has
given me headaches ever since I have been here, and if you
want me to put this program over you have to give me men
I can work with." Plaintiff Fisher assigned as the reason
for the rift his refusal to be a mere "yes man" on the board
of trustees. At this same meeting 11 member of the church
raised the question whether there were improperly present
any nonmembers of the church. After some discussion plaintiff Brewer arose and said: "Brother Moderator, I would
likc to give thc BaptiRt Church position on that." Reverend
Henderson responded: "Nobody asked you anything about
the Baptist Church. I have been told you run around here
with Hiscox Directory and Roberts Rules of Order under
your arm, the watchdog of the church." Reverend Venerable
was expelled from the church because he had circulated a
pamphlet criticizing Reverend Henderson's administration.
At the meeting where Reverend Venerable was expelled,
Reverend Henderson refused to allow plaintiff Brewer to
speak in Reverend Venerable's defense on the ground that
Reverenrl Brewer was not a member of the church because he
had not made a regular pledge. At the meeting at which
plaintiffs were expelled, Reverend Henderson refused to

)
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nllow Rcverend Brcwer's son to speak in his father's udell".!
on the same ~round. He admitted on cross-examination that
he han \·xumincd the financial list of the church before the
mf'etinll in anticipation of the . possibility that Revt!ren(l
Brlm'er's Hon mil!ht want to. speak in his father's behalf.
Rcvcrend Henderson's attitude toward members who sued
tht' church is reflected in his statement in the church bulletin
for May 12, 1946: "Any and aU IDcmbers who dare to sue
the church will be turned out. They will be kept out as unworthy of onr fcllowship. Those who have been excluded need
not attempt to come back. The peace of the Church must
not be ullllin nistnrbed by them. Read 1 Cor. 6 :1. 'Dare any
of you, having ~ matter :~ninst another, go to law before
thl' unjust, :md not before the saints.' "
. The jury could conclude that Reverend Henderson had
developed a stro~g dislike for plaintiffs. They could also
conclude that Reverend Henderson ~ished to free himself
of any criticism by expeiling his opponents from the church.
These facts considered with the language of the opening
paragraph of the charges read to the church are clearly sufficient to support a finding of a' malicious or improper motive
for the publication on the part of Reverend Hcnderson.
[5] In the CaNe of defendants Hilton and Hunson evidt'nr.e of an abuse of privilege may be found on tht' fnce of
the chargc."I themselves. Althollflh malicc may not bE' inferred from the fact alonl' of the eommunieation of a defamatory !;tatement (Civ. Code § 48), the tenor of t.hl' statf'mrnt
may be evidence of malice. (Davis v. H carst, supra, If.6;
Siemon v. Finkle, 81tpra, 618; Locke v. Mitckrll, 7 Ca1.2d :'99,
603 [61 P.2d 922].) "On the subject of actual malice it is
important to note further that while one may, on a privileged occasion and without malice, publish to the interested
persons what may be false, if he honestly believes it to be
true, he is not by this rule given a license to overdraw, exaggerate, or to eolor the facts in his communication. The manner of statement is material upon the question of malice, and
if the facts believed to be true are exaggerated, overdrawn,
or colored to the detriment of plaintiff, or are not stated
fully and fairly with respect to the plaintiff, the court or
jury may properly consider these circumstances as evidence
tending to prove actual malice, and they may be sufficient
for that purpose without otber evidence on the subject."
(Sn'ivcly v. Record Publishing Co., supra, 578.)
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[6] All examination of the charges read to the church
shows that they contained most if not all of the vices condenmed in the Snively case. The jury could reasonably conclude that in stating that plaintiff Fisher was removed from
the board of trustees because of his vile spirit and disrespect
for leadership, dllfendants exaggerated the cause for his dismissal. The description of plaintiff Brewer as a noncontributing member was misleading. Although he made no regular
pledge to the church, he gave $55 on one occasion and on
another pledged $150 to the building fund. Furthermore,
the charges associated plaintiffs with one of Satan'8 choicest
tools.
There is evidence also from which the jury could have inferred that defendants lacked reasonable grounds for believing the charges. This limitation upon qualified privilege is
particularly a.(>propriatc when, as in this case, a pr~vilege
is claimed on thc ground that defendants were carrying out
their duty of investigating misconduct and reporting the
rl'sults with their recommendations to the church. Defendant
Hilton admitted that he did not interpret the termination of
the Vencrable action as "a judicial establishment that the
charges set forth in the complaint were downright falsehoods. " The jury could have found that no investigation
was made by the deacons into the question of the validity of
the elections, that no attempt was made to learn whether
plaintiffs were acting in good faith, and that in drafting
their charges defendants Hilton aita Hudson were carelessly
repeating statements previously made to the congregation
by Reverend Henderson. We cannot say, therefore, that the
evidence was not sufficient to support the verdict against
defendants Hilton and Hudson.
[7] Defendant Henderson contends that the following instruction on the question of exemplary damages was prejudicially erroneous:
"You are instructed that, if you should find that the
article in question was published wantonly, recklessly, and
with an utter disregard as to whether it was true or false,
then the plaintiffs are entitled to recover exemplary or punitive damages as well as compcnsatory damages."
This instruction was clearly erroneous, for a plaintiff is
never entitled as a matter of right to exemplary damages.
(Schomberg v. Walker, 132 Cal. 224, 230 [64 P. 290] ; Davis
v. Heard, supra, 173; Lew'is v. Hayes, 165 Cal. 527, 533
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[132 P. 1022, Ann.Cas. 1914D 148]; see Clark v. McClurg,
215 Cal. 279, 282 [9 P.2d 505, 81 A.L.R. 908].) As this court
stated in Davis v. Hearst and reiterated in Lewis v. Hayes,
in speaking of an instruction nearly identical with the one in
question, "The vice of this instruction is that it tells the
jury that, upon finding malice in fact, the plaintiff is entitled, as of right, to an award of punitive damages. A plaintiff, upon establishing his case, is always entitled of right to
compensatory damages. But even after establishing a case
where punitive damages are permissible, he is never entitled
to them. The granting or withholding of the award of punitive damages is wholly within the control of the jury, and
may not legally be influenced by any direction of the court
that in any case a plaintiff is entitled to them. Upon the
clearest proof of malice in fact, it is still the exclusive province of the jury to say whether or not punitive damages shall
be awarded. A plaintiff is entitled to such damages only
after the jury, in the exercise of its untrammeled discretion,
has made the award." Reverend Henderson was entitled to
the free exercise of the jury's discretion., This right he was
denied.
[8] Defendants contend finally that the general damages
were excessive. A motion for a new trial on this ground,
among others, was denied. The question of excessiveness is
addressed primarily to the discretion of the trial court, and
an award that stands approved by that court will not be disturbed on appeal unless it appears that the jury was influenced by passion or prejudice. (Scott v. Times-Mirror Co.,
181 Cal. 345, 366 [184 P. 672, 12 A.L.R. 1007].) 1!pon the
record before us we cannot say that the jury was gO influenced.
[9] The appellate courts have power to order a retrial
on a limited issue, if that issue can be separately tried without such confusion or uncertainty as would amount to a
denial of a fair trial. (Gasoline Products Co. v. Champlin
Refining Co., 283 U.S. 494, 499 [51 S.Ct. 513, 75 L.Ed. 1188] ;
see Robinson v. Muir, 151 Cal. 118, 125 [90 P. 521].) Whether
it can or not depends upon the circumstances of each case.
The issue of exemplary damages is separate and distinct
from that of actual damages, for they are assessed to punish
the defendant and not to compensate for any loss suffered
by the plaintiff. [10] The rule that exemplary damages
cannot be imposed unless the plaintiff has suffered actual
13 C.Zd-a
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damages (Clark v. McClury, 215 Cal. 279 [9 P.2d 505, 81
A.L.R 908J ; Haydel v. Mortun, 8 Cal.App.2d 730 [48 P.2d
709) is based on the principle that the defendant ruust
have committed a tortious act before exemplary damage!>
can be assessed. (See McCormick on Damages, 293.) "Buch
damages are mere incidents to the cause of action and can
never constitute the basis thereof." (Clark v. MeClury,
supra, at 282.) In view of the jury's verdict and the award
of general damages in this case the commission of a tortious
act by defendants is established. There is therefore no reason
for having a second jury determine that issue.
'l'he rule that exemplary damages must bear a reasonable
relation to actual damages (Wilkinson v. Singh, 93 Cal.App.
337, 345 [269 P. 705]; Plotnik v. Rosenberg, 55 Cal.App.
408, 411 f203 P. 438]) is designed solely to gunrd against
I:'xcessive pu~itive damages. (McCormick on Damages, SU1)rtl,
298.) Upon a retrial of the issue of exemplary damages tho
jury can maintain that reasonable relation between general
and exemplary damages without having to determine for
itself the amount of gtlneral damages. The amount of general
damag-es has been properly determined by the first jury.
Upon a retrial of the isS1l'e of exemplary damages it is only
necessary "for the second jury to be advised of the amount of
general damages already awarded in order that it may maintain a reasonable relation between such damages and - the
exemplary damages, if any, that it awards. If it fails to do
so and awards excessive exemplary damages, there is an adequate remedy by way of an appropriate motion before the
trial court or by appeal.
[11] The jury returned a verdict in favor of each plaintiff for $2,000 general damages against the three defendants
and $5,000 exemplary damages against defendant Henderson.
All defendants are jointly and severally liable on the judgment for general damages. Since there can be no apportionment of the judgment for general damages, a retrial of the
issue of general damages as to defendant Henderson would
require a retrial of that issue as to defendants Hilton and
Hudson, for otherwise Hilton and Hudson would remain
jointly and severally liable for general damages, but defendant Henderson would have the benefit of a retrial of that
issue. 'fo retry the issue of damages as to all defendants,
however, would nullify the judgment for general damages
as to defendants Hilton and Hudson, although the judgment
has been properly entered against them.

)

The judgment is reversed insofar as it decrees the recovery
of the separate sums of $5,000 from Reverend J. R. Henderson, and the trial court is directed to retry the issue of
exemplary damages against him ,only. In all other respects
the judgment is 8.mrmed. Respondents Fisher and BrewE:r
are to recover their costs on the appeal of defendants Hilton
and Hudson. Each side is to bear its own costs on this appeal
of defendant Henderson.
Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
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